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SECURITIES REGULATION-NINTH
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N United States v. Salman, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
was urged to adopt a recent change to the standard of insider trading
announced and adopted by the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit in United States v. Newman.' Though the Second Circuit's ruling is
not legally binding on the Ninth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit faced a direct
challenge by the defendant-appellant to adopt this Newman standard and
reverse his conviction for conspiracy and insider trading.2 In declining to
follow the Newman standard and affirming the conviction, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that proof of material, nonpublic information disclosed by an
insider with the intent to benefit a trading relative or friend was sufficient
evidence to establish a breach of fiduciary duty and, thus, insider trading.3
Though this appears to be a controversial circuit split on its face, in actu-
ality, the difference in the interpretation of Supreme Court precedent
stems from the circuit courts' being faced with two very different insider
trading cases. 4 The Ninth Circuit correctly upheld the conviction, but its
narrow interpretation of the Newman standard was inappropriate in the
context of this fairly traditional misappropriation scenario.
This case involves an insider trading scheme among Bassam Yacoub
Salman (Salman) and members of his extended family. 5 In 2002, Maher
Kara (Maher) joined Citigroup as an investment banker in their health-
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2017; The University of Texas at
Austin, 2014. Eternally grateful for the love and support of my family and friends as I
pursue my goals.
1. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 2015); United States v. New-
man, 773 F.3d 438, 450 (2d Cir. 2014) cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015).
2. See Salman, 792 F.3d at 1088.
3. Id. at 1094.
4. Compare Salman, 792 F.3d at 1088-89 (involving a short chain of causation among
family members in a misappropriation insider trading case), with Newman, 773 F.3d at 443
(involving a remote tippee in a classical insider trading case).
5. Salman, 792 F.3d at 1088.
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care group. 6 In 2004, his older brother, Michael Kara (Michael), began to
solicit confidential information about Citigroup's upcoming transactions.7
Maher suspected Michael was trading on the information, but still "know-
ingly obliged" Michael's requests from 2004 to 2007.8 In 2003, Maher be-
came engaged to Salman's sister.9 As the two families grew more familiar
with one another, Salman and Michael most notably became "fast
friends."' 0 Michael began to share his inside information with Salman,
and encouraged Salman to mirror his trading moves. 1 Salman acquiesced
and discretely made the trades through a brokerage account held jointly
by his wife's sister and her husband.' 2 Profits from these trades totaled
upwards of $2 million from 2004 to 2007.13
In 2013, a jury found Salman guilty of one count of conspiracy to com-
mit securities fraud and four counts of securities fraud.' 4 During the trial,
Michael, who had already plead guilty, testified for the government that
Salman had inquired about where Michael had gotten the information
and "Michael told him, directly, that it came from Maher."' 5 Michael also
testified to once confronting Salman about being careless with the infor-
mation after finding evidence of the trades left out openly in Salman's
office, and to he and Salman's agreement that "they [both] had to 'pro-
tect' Maher."'1 6 To further bolster its case, the government offered evi-
dence of Maher and Michael's "close and mutually beneficial
relationship," including the following facts: Michael paid a portion of
Maher's college tuition, Michael "stood in for their deceased father at
Maher's wedding," and Michael taught Maher scientific concepts to help
further his career. 17 Maher testified that he gave Michael the inside infor-
mation to "benefit" Michael and meet Michael's "needs."' 8 In a specific
instance, Michael asked Maher for information as a "favor" because he
"owe[d] somebody," but refused to take money from Maher so that he
could receive an inside tip about a pending acquisition from Maher in-
stead. 19 Lastly, the government illustrated that Salman knew of Michael
and Maher's "close fraternal relationship" by offering examples of times
when Salman was a witness to such intimate and demonstrable exchanges
between the brothers at family events.20
After the jury found Salman guilty, Salman was denied his motion for a
6. Id.







14. Id. at 1088.





20. Id. at 1090.
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new trial and thus appealed to the Ninth Circuit.21 In his opening brief,
Salman did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. 22 However, af-
ter the Second Circuit's Newman decision was issued, Salman moved to
file a supplemental brief, asserting that the government's evidence was
"insufficient under the standard announced in Newman," which he ar-
gued the Ninth Circuit should adopt.23 The Ninth Circuit granted the mo-
tion, allowed the government to respond, and held they had jurisdiction
to address Salman's claim on the merits. 24
In an opinion written by the Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, the court held
"the evidence was more than sufficient for a rational jury to find both
that inside information was disclosed in breach of a fiduciary duty, and
that Salman knew of that breach at the time he traded on it. ' '25 The court
declined to follow Newman, reasoning that to do so would require the
court to depart from clear Supreme Court precedent in Dirks v. S.E.C.
26
There, the Supreme Court determined breach of fiduciary duty, the fun-
damental element in insider trading cases, is met where an "insider makes
a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend."' 27 Maher
asserted that he had disclosed the inside information to benefit and pro-
vide for his brother, thus breaching his fiduciary duty to Citigroup by
receiving the personal benefit of benefitting a relative.2 8
In affirming Salman's insider trading conviction, the Ninth Circuit re-
lied on the well-established Supreme Court precedent in Dirks.29 As
background, there are two theories that serve as the foundation of insider
trading: the "classical" and "misappropriation" theories. 30 Under the
classical theory, insider trading occurs when an insider trades the corpo-
ration's own securities based on material, nonpublic information about
the corporation. 31 The scope of liability for insider trading was expanded
under the misappropriation theory, under which liability may be found
where an "outsider" possesses material, nonpublic information about a
corporation and uses that information to trade in breach of the fiduciary
duty owed by the insider providing the information. 32 Dirks further ex-
panded insider trading liability by forbidding insiders and misap-
propriators from giving undisclosed information (acting as a "tipper") to





25. Id. at 1094, n.* (noting Judge Rakoff is the Senior District Judge for the Southern
District of New York sitting by designation in the Ninth Circuit).
26. Id. at 1093.
27. Id. (quoting Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983)).
28. Id. at 1094.
29. Id. at 1094.
30. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 445 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
242 (2015).
31. Id. (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980)).
32. Id. at 445-46. (citing United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652-53 (1997)).
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information for their personal gain."'3 3 In the present case, Salman re-
ceived the inside information from a misappropriator, making him a
tippee.34
The Salman court noted that, under Dirks, the test for whether an in-
sider breached its fiduciary duty "is whether the insider will personally
benefit, directly or indirectly, from [the] disclosure. 35 The court said that
"a tippee is equally liable if 'the tippee knows or should know that there
has been [such] a breach,"' and thus, knows of the personal benefit.36 It
read Dirks to define a "personal benefit" as "'a pecuniary gain or a
reputational benefit that will translate into future earnings,"' or an in-
sider's "gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend."
'37
Under the Ninth Circuit's analysis, Maher's admission to leaking inside
information to Michael, knowing that Michael was trading on it, is exactly
the "gift of confidential information to a relative" that Dirks governs,
since Maher testified that he revealed the information to benefit his
brother and fulfill his needs. 38 In regards to Salman's knowledge, Michael
asserted that he "directly" told Salman that Maher provided the inside
information that the two had traded on, and Michael and Salman had
both agreed that because of this they needed to "protect" Maher.3 9
Salman was also aware of Michael and Maher's close, fraternal relation-
ship, making it reasonable for a jury to determine that "Salman could
readily have inferred Maher's intent to benefit Michael."' 40 Therefore,
under Dirks, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the evidence was sufficient
for the jury to find that Maher had disclosed the information in breach of
his fiduciary duties and that Salman knew the breach and the personal
benefit derived therefrom. 41
Newman expanded the Dirks standard, holding that when a court can
infer a personal benefit from a personal relationship between the tipper
and tippee, "such an inference is impermissible in the absence of proof of
a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an exchange that
is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a
pecuniary or similarly valuable nature."'42 This led the Second Circuit to
conclude that evidence in the case of remote, fourth-tier tippees, was cir-
cumstantial and not sufficient to support the inference that the insiders
received personal benefit and the remote tippees knew they were trading
on information from the insiders.43 In refusing to follow this interpreta-
tion of Dirks, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that following the Newman
33. Salman, 792 F.3d at 1091 (citing Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983)).
34. Id. at 1092.
35. Id. (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662).
36. Id. (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 660).
37. Id. (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663-64).








standard would require it to depart from the holding in Dirks that insid-
ers breach their fiduciary duty when theygift inside information to a rela-
tive on which that relative could trade.44 The evidence presented by the
government clearly showed that Maher breached his fiduciary duty when
he disclosed "material[,] nonpublic information" with the intent to bene-
fit a relative; thus, the court found, the government met the Supreme
Court's Dirks standard. 45
Though the Ninth Circuit reached the right outcome in this straightfor-
ward insider trading scheme, the court could have done so without
overtly declining to follow Newman (just as Judge Rakoff did in S.E.C. v.
Payton46), but rather, by factually distinguishing between the two cases
and their policy implications. Newman involved an appeal from the con-
victions of two former portfolio managers for insider trading.47 Through a
chain of insiders and analysts, the defendants in Newman were about four
levels removed from the initial inside tippers, but eventually made trades
based on nonpublic information. 48 The defendants in Newman also
claimed that they did not know where the information came from, prof-
fering evidence that information of a similar type (but not from an in-
sider) is often passed from analysts to portfolio managers in a similar
format.49 Salman presented a strikingly different situation.
In Salman, there was a short chain of causation-from brother to
brother to an extended family member-and each actor was aware of the
information's origin and confidential nature.50 By distinguishing between
these two very important factual differences, the Ninth Circuit could have
acknowledged the Newman standard without explicitly disclaiming it by
pointing to the different contexts of the two cases. The Ninth Circuit
could have reasoned that the "gift of confidential information to a rela-
tive" provision in Dirks still applied in this case where there was no issue
of a remote tippee, but rather, a common familial trading scheme.51
Additionally, the differing policy implications noted in both cases sup-
port the conclusion that the Ninth Circuit could have acknowledged the
Newman standard, but rationalized against its use in the context of
Salman. In the case of a remote tippee, the Second Circuit supported its
novel interpretation of Dirks in order to counter recent insider trading
prosecutions that are "increasingly targeted at remote tippees many
levels removed from corporate insiders. '5 2 This promotes efficiency in
the national securities markets by narrowing a court's focus to the actual
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1094.
46. See S.E.C. v. Payton, 97 F. Supp. 3d 558, 565 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (noting that, in this
case, Judge Rakoff was bound by the Second Circuit's Newman standard).
47. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct.
242 (2015).
48. Id. at 443.
49. Id. at 443, 454.
50. Salman, 792 F.3d at 1089.
51. See id. at 1089, 1092.
52. Newman, 773 F.3d at 448.
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breach of fiduciary duty.5 3 This is a strong policy argument in the case of
the "remote, downstream tippee" in a circuit that handles the majority of
securities regulation cases, but it is not relevant in the context of an in-
sider trading scheme like in Salman.54 The Ninth Circuit based their hold-
ing on the policy rationale that if a narrow interpretation of the Newman
standard is accepted then any corporate insider or misappropriator could
disclose inside information to relatives, who could then trade on it, so
long as he or she asks for no "tangible compensation. '55 This rationale
focuses specifically on insider trading in the context of a short chain of
causation between family members who all know where the inside infor-
mation is coming from, identical to the facts in Salman.56 Had the Ninth
Circuit distinguished the two cases based on their facts, it could have nar-
rowed the holding of Salman so that Salman did not directly conflict with
the Second Circuit's Newman standard and the policy objectives behind
that standard. 57 Both circuit courts could have fulfilled the separate pol-
icy objectives without alienating each other by simply emphasizing the
specific insider trading scheme that each holding aimed to regulate.
Additionally, the court only evaluated the Newman standard under the
narrow interpretation that Salman, as the appellant-defendant, presented
to the court. In his supplemental brief, Salman read Newman to hold that
"evidence of a friendship or familial relationship between the tipper and
tippee, standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate that the tipper re-
ceived a benefit." 58 Thus, Salman argued that there was insufficient evi-
dence to uphold the conviction. 59 Rather than trying to distinguish this
case based on the facts or interpret the Newman holding more broadly,
the Ninth Circuit simply declined to follow the Second Circuit.60 Had the
court interpreted the Newman standard more broadly based on the "quid
pro quo" provision, the Ninth Circuit could have determined that the
conviction would still be upheld under the Newman standard, while still
using Dirks as the primary and binding authority. 61 Newman holds that
evidence of a personal benefit inferred from a personal relationship be-
tween the tipper and tippee is impermissible unless there is evidence of "a
relationship between the insider and recipient that suggests a quid pro
quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit from the [latter]."' 62 Had
the Ninth Circuit used this language, as Judge Rakoff did in Payton, the
53. See id. at 449.
54. Bryan Neil Hoffman and Kevin C. McAdam, Holland & Hart Discuss Newman
Cert., A Potential Tipping Point for Insider Trading Liability, CLS BLUE SKY Bi OG (Aug.
25, 2015), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/08/25/newman-cert-a-potential-tipping-
point-for-insider-trading-liability/ [perma.cc/EB9E-3F6F].
55. Salman, 792 F.3d at 1094.
56. See id.
57. See generally Salman, 792 F.3d at 1087; Newman, 773 F.3d at 438.
58. Salman, 792 F.3d at 1093.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452.




court could have easily interpreted the evidence in Salman to fit this ex-
ception. 63 Maher testified that he gave Michael inside information to ben-
efit his brother, while evidence was also presented that Michael helped
pay Maher's college tuition, "stood in for their deceased father at
Maher's wedding," and helped teach Maher scientific concepts for his
job.64 Both brothers benefitted one another, thus forming a quid pro quo
relationship that could be interpreted as an exception to the Newman
holding.65 Maher also testified of his intention to benefit his brother by
disclosing the inside information.66 In this way-by interpreting Newman
broadly as described above-the Ninth Circuit could have reconciled the
two seemingly conflicting cases.
While reading the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Salman, it is important to
keep in mind that it is written by Judge Rakoff, who is well respected and
known as an expert in the field of securities regulation. 67 Sitting as a visit-
ing judge in the overworked and overburdened Ninth Circuit allowed
Judge Rakoff to write an opinion rejecting the Newman standard and ex-
ert influence although he normally would be bound to follow Second Cir-
cuit precedent. 68 Additionally, the Supreme Court denied the petition of
certiorari to review Newman on October 5, 2015, leaving the door open
for a petition from Salman. 69
With the circuit split still pending, the Supreme Court may choose to
review Salman due to its express denial of the Second Circuit's interpre-
tation of the law in Newman. The Ninth Circuit could have distinguished
this case based on the facts and context, policy, or by broadly interpreting
Newman, all of which would have been effective means to avoid overtly
declining to follow the Second Circuit. Instead, the Ninth Circuit did de-
cline to follow Newman's new interpretation of insider trading law, rely-
ing on the established Supreme Court precedent in Dirks.70 Had the
Ninth Circuit taken a less adversarial route to reconcile the two cases, a
much less controversial decision would have resulted. Nonetheless, the
court did arrive at the correct outcome.
63. See S.E.C. v. Payton, 97 F. Supp. 3d 558, 562 (2015).
64. Salman, 792 F.3d at 1089.
65. See Payton, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 562 (illustrating Judge Rakoff's interpretation of a
quid pro quo relationship as one in which there is evidence that both parties intended to
benefit one another).
66. Salman, 792 F.3d at 1092.
67. Jed Rakoff, Adjunct Professor, COLUMBIA LAW SciooL, http://web.law.columbia
.edu/courses/instructors/8698(Judge Rakoff serves as a professor at Columbia Law School,
teaching several courses, including White Collar Crime) [perma.cc/7V3G-7A8H].
68. Jacob Gershman, Rakoff and Ninth Circuit Throw Cold Water on Insider Trading
Ruling, WALL ST. J.: LAW BLOG (July 6, 2013, 5:20 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2015/07/
06/rakoff-and-ninth-circuit-throw-cold-water-on-insider-trading-ruling/ [perma.cc!EJQ4-
MG3G].
69. United States v. Newman, 136 S. Ct. at 242.
70. See Salman, 792 F.3d at 1092.
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